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Climate change adaptation coevolves with urban development trajectories presenting
decision-makers with a choice of positioning adaptation to protect or revise development.
This relational view of adaptation in the context of large cities opens questions on the ways
in which city and other actors interact. This interaction may be as or more important than
resource and information access for shaping the adaptive capacity and direction of such
assemblages. Transitions between modes of adaptation are little understood and will likely
combine autonomous and deliberate change both incremental and transformative. Using
London as a case study, the paper identiﬁes the contemporary adaptation regime to extreme
events and its lines of movement. Interviews and a scenario workshop with resilience
planners and emergency managers show the orientation of London’s adaptation is ﬁrmly
positioned in a mode of resilience, protecting development through ﬂexibility. Maintaining
resilience to extremes under conditions of economic austerity is seen to result in the
shifting of risk management burdens onto those at risk. Self-reliance is emerging as a
mechanism for deepening the resilience mode of adaptation. At the same time, when
considering potential risks for extreme events in 2035, most planners express a desire for
more transformative adaptation that can tackle root causes in social conditions. A gap is
revealed between the professional judgment of risk and resilience planning needs and likely
trajectories constrained by national administrations and policy.
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1. Introduction
Adaptation to climate change in large cities presents an assemblage of interacting
practices, technologies and discourses. Over time adaptation assemblages pass
through multiple policy cycles (Howlett and Ramesh 2003) interacting with other
public policy domains and activities (Stone 2002). These elements coevolve to-
gether (Zaidi and Pelling 2015) or periodically become locked in to more rigid
states (Rotmans et al. 2001). Seen as part of the coevolving urban condition,
assemblages of adaptation are at once intimately involved in the reproduction of
social opportunity and wellbeing. This relational reading of adaptation emphasizes
leadership, institutional context and competing planning agendas as key constraints
(Measham 2011), alongside more established constraints of information and re-
source access (Inderberg and Eikeland 2009).
When adaptation is seen as coevolving with urban development trajectories,
decision-makers are presented with a choice — adaptation can deliberately be
deployed to protect existing development gains and processes, or where these are
generative of unacceptable vulnerability and risk, development itself can be a
subject of adaptation (Pelling 2011). Conceiving of adaptation assemblages as part
of coevolving relationships between climate change risk management and devel-
opment trajectories in the city raises questions about the relative dynamism of
assemblage components and the surrounding social-ecological environment: why
and when change occurs, how change is initiated and where it travels. Can ad-
aptation keep pace with social-ecological change and indeed be anticipatory of
such changes, or must adaptation be reactive? Who might the change leaders be in
a speciﬁc context and what interests will block transitions in adaptation?
Greater London’s climate change adaptation assemblage includes the policies,
tools and actions of 32 local authorities, the Greater London Authority (GLA),
national agencies such as Public Health England and the Environment Agency and
a range of private sector and civil society interests as well as individuals and
businesses at risk. Organizations themselves are composed of sub-units and indi-
viduals who also have agency (Pelling et al. 2007), while organizations exerting
structural constrains on this agency will themselves be subject to the inﬂuence of
national institutions (Measham et al. 2011). Within the city the balance between
adaptation and development is held at a policy level by London’s local authorities
and the GLA as the primary agencies responsible for risk management but also for
economic development policy. The GLA aims to “position London as an inter-
national leader in tackling climate change” (GLA 2011: 20) and in its London
Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2011) recognizes that adaptation can provide
wider beneﬁts, for example, by promoting green spaces. London’s local authorities
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and the GLA are in addition inﬂuenced by interests in voluntary or mandated
partnerships but it is through the lens of the local authority and GLA relationship
that constraints and struggles over the relationships between adaptation and de-
velopment planning can be seen most clearly.
Climate change is already being felt in cities through increasing temperatures and
the ﬂood risk associated with elevated sea level (IPCC 2014). London is exposed to
extremes in rainfall and coastal ﬂood and storm surge, drought, cold and heat
shocks. The London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2011) projected that by
the middle of the 21st century, the average summer day will be 2.7○C warmer and
very hot days 6.5○C warmer. By mid-century, most summers are projected to be the
equivalent of ‘heatwave’ temperatures today (McCarthy and Sanderson, 2010 in
GLA 2011). By the middle of the century, the average winter is projected to be 15
percent wetter and the wettest winter 33 percent wetter than the baseline average.
Sea levels are projected to rise by up to 1m by the end of the century, with an
extreme scenario projecting up to 2m. An extreme scenario a 0.7m increase in tidal
surge height by 2100 has been projected. The Mayor’s Regional Flood Risk
Appraisal (GLA 2009), has revealed an estimated 1.25 million people and nearly
half a million properties, extensive social and civil infrastructure (such as schools,
hospitals and train stations) at high ﬂood risk. Research by the Environment Agency
has shown that the poorest 10 percent of Londoners are more likely to live in areas of
tidal ﬂood risk, and that both the richest and the poorest ten per cent of Londoners
live at ﬂuvial ﬂood risk (GLA 2011). The growth of London will increase the
number of people living and working on the ﬂoodplain, and the associated assets at
risk would also increase. This would be the case both within Greater London and
surrounding commuter towns, especially those in the Thames Gateway which lies
within the Thames ﬂoodplain (Royse et al. 2010).
Adaptation, including to climate and weather extremes, requires an ability to
learn and act on that learning (Inderberg and Eikeland 2009). In London, emer-
gency services, urban planners and resilience planners working for local authorities
and the GLA share technical viewpoints to help connect across political and or-
ganizational interests and mandates, and with science enabling interaction.
Capacity to act is strongly constrained by national policy especially since 2012 as
legislation associated with the current period of austerity has reduced planning
guidance and budgets to local authorities. At the time of researching, UK local
governments have recently experienced a 40 percent cut in resources (Local
Government Association 2014). So-called austerity politics have cut risk man-
agement and resilience ofﬁcer posts and forced public sector agencies to retreat to
the core protection roles of risk management. The economic implications of
BREXIT seem likely to deepen this challenge for London.
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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In the GLA, resilience planning has been repositioned from being a voice for
integrated development and risk management planning located at the policy core of
theMayor’s Ofﬁce to sit within a moremarginal technical bodies — the London Fire
Brigade and Mayor’s Ofﬁce for Policing and Crime and is now associated with a
more narrow risk management and civil protection agenda. At the same time, there is
recognition of growing social inequality in the city and its expression in hazard
exposure and vulnerability. Once links are made between equity and risk, social
policy becomes a more central tool for risk reduction and London is among those
cities where the link is becoming increasingly clear. What are the implications of
these dynamics for Greater London’s adaptation pathway? What actors and pro-
cesses lie behind these movements and are they amenable to further transitions?
To approach these concerns three questions are asked in this paper.
. What are the current relationships between risk management, climate change
adaptation and development?
. Is there evidence that a transition to a new risk management pathway position is
desirable among practitioners?
. If there is a desire for transition how will this be enabled or constrained by
the current organisational and policy architecture for adaptation and risk man-
agement in the city?
The paper is part of a wider analysis of climate change adaptation transitions in
coastal megacities supported by the Transformation and Resilience on Urban
Coasts (TRUC) project see www.bel-truc.org. A common analytical framework
(Solecki et al. 2017) and methodological tool kit has been deployed across these
cities which includes Kolkata (Narayanan et al. 2017), Lagos (Ajibade et al.
2017), New York (Link and Solecki 2017) and Tokyo (Nishi et al. 2016). Analysis
presented in this paper draws on data collected in 2016 through a workshop with
15 participants and subsequently 19 expert interviews with risk and resilience
managers employed by local authorities, the GLA and national agencies with remit
in London.
This paper is organized into four sections. The following section discusses
transition in risk management and is followed by a discussion of results organized
by the three questions presented above, and ﬁnal conclusions.
2. Transition in Urban Risk Management and Sustainable
Development
Observed and projected increases in climate variability and extremes move disaster
risk management towards the center of efforts to secure a sustainable development
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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(Schipper and Pelling 2006). In large cities, disaster risks require management
through responsive mode emergency services, but also through risk reduction
delivered by closely integrated sectoral planning to ensure risk management is
comprehensive (Revi et al. 2014). This more inclusive and comprehensive vision
of disaster risk management aligns existing work much more directly with ongoing
social, economic and cultural dimensions of sustainable development and trade-
offs between them, and is likely to require transformational change in disaster risk
management.
There is growing recognition in adaptation literature that governing transfor-
mational change requires transformation of governance systems themselves.
However, the speed, scale and depth of deliberate transformational change is
challenging for policy makers and the public. Some suggest that transformational
outcomes could be delivered through incremental steps as well as transformational
moments (Pelling 2011; Kates et al. 2012). But also that incremental steps limit
ambition and so can undermine transformative movements (Pelling et al. 2015).
Tremeer et al. (2016) offer move beyond this impasse by proposing the notion of
continuous transformational change. This recognizes incremental and transfor-
mative change can coexist, and that transformations can be emergent as much or
perhaps more than being planned. This blurs the duality between autonomous and
planned adaptation so that processes of change may merge serendipity, accident
and deliberation.
Transformation is used in the literature to describe both a process of change
and an outcome. Here, we distinguish between outcomes and process by describing
the process of change as transition. This leaves open the possibility that incre-
mental and/or transformational processes and acts can shape transitions to trans-
formative outcomes. Transition can unfold between a number of states in the
adaptation–development relationship. Transformation is used to describe adaptation–
development relationships that accept change in development is required to reduce
risk. Similarly resilience describes relationships built on the goal of ﬂexibility in
development and resistance an orientation that presents adaptation in risk man-
agement with the goal of preventing change in development, collapse describes
those relationships where no strategic linkages exist. Table 1 presents and exem-
pliﬁes these four relational positions (Solecki et al. in press).
Development is taken to describe the structures of governance, physical tech-
nologies and dominant customs that determine the social and spatial distribution of
socio-economic and ecological wellbeing. We are interested in the extent to which
dominant adaptation–development relationships and transition from one status to
another can be described for megacities and if this is moving London closer to
sustainable development.
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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Observed development–adaptation relationships will be messier; more multiple,
dynamic and contested than Table 1 implies. They are used here to locate stake-
holder perceptions of the development-adaptation relationship to open a conver-
sation on transition. No hierarchy of preferred development–adaptation
relationship exists. This will be dependent on context and viewpoint, movement
from one mode to all others is considered possible. Transition, weather by au-
tonomous or deliberate will unfold within the adaptation assemblage. Drawing on
Harvey’s (2010) methodology of moments, Pelling et al. (2015) propose seven
activity spheres that map where transitions can unfold:
. as discourse in political claim making,
. as technological innovation,
. as reform in administrative and legal systems,
. as a shift in economic orientation or individual livelihood,
. as an awakening of alternative values,
. as restructuring in physical and ecological systems,
. as an assertion of new practices ad routines of behavior.
Observing where transition emerges and the pathways through which it is
channeled can help prepare megacities for necessary transitions ahead. Under-
standing better points of blockage or acceleration, and processes by which tran-
sition in one activity sphere inﬂuences another can be important tools in shaping
urban development pathways that are adaptive and can move towards the proce-
dural and distributional equity goals of sustainable development.
Two participatory methods were used to identify risk management and resil-
ience planners’ views on current adaptation planning and potential for transition in
London. While an analysis of viewpoints is presented in this paper, the wider aim
of the TRUC project was to provide spaces for planners to reﬂect on the vision,
organization and practice of adaptation and consider strategies for transition. The
ﬁrst engagement with practitioners was through a one day scenario workshop. The
aim of the workshop was to identify participants’ collective views on the rela-
tionships between London’s development trajectory and its scope for adaptation.
This was followed by semi-structured interviews with participants and additional
respondents unable to attend the workshop. Respondents were asked to identify the
aims of current adaptation planning and which agencies had been most important
in shaping this position. Four extreme future risk scenarios were presented and
respondents asked to consider if transition in adaptation through risk management
would be appropriate to better secure sustainable development. The deployment of
two methods allowed for triangulation and provided participants a period of re-
ﬂection between events.
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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3. Results
3.1. What are the current relationships between risk management,
climate change adaptation and development?
The aim of risk management in London is overwhelmingly perceived to be
resilience — to protect existing development practices and land-use while being
ﬂexible to better live with risks. Within this many respondents recognized an
increasing focus on self-reliance. Referring to the Pitt Review (UK Govern-
ment 2007) — a national review of ﬂood risk management folding ﬂooding in
2007 — the Head of Emergency Planning from an inner London borough pointed
out that:
If you build near a river you need to know that you have to look
after yourself. This push towards stronger self-responsibility has
happened in particular over the past ﬁve years or so. I think it was
because of the Pitt Review that it happened.
Figure 1. Climate Change Adaptation and Development Scenarios for London
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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Figure 1 reinforces this assessment, here workshop participants described London
as only weekly committed to adaption with state actors having reduced capacity
and with a generally high burden of personal responsibility for risk mitigation
(‘current’ in Figure 1). Respondents shared an aspiration for a more adaptive city,
although the degree to which this should be best achieved by increased state or
personal action was more contested. Even though a strong welfare state assuming a
high degree of social responsibility was perceived as desirable, participants
maintained that personal responsibility for risk mitigation ought to be strengthened
and motivated.
London has been growing increasingly unequal, driven in particular by a crisis
in housing supply (Travers et al. 2016). This has not been a core consideration in
determining adaptation policy for London to date. The lack of attention to
London’s rising inequality in risk planning may be reﬂected in the inﬂuence of
national as well as city level actors for the contemporary positioning of adaptation,
and the role of science and business interests. Within these levels of activity
technical agencies, rather than politicians including the London Mayor were per-
ceived to be most inﬂuential, reﬂecting the technical content of adaptation and risk
management plans. The media and local authorities were also regarded as inﬂu-
ential. Civil society was perceived as having little impact on shaping the current
regime orientation — again indicative of technical/professional leadership in risk
management and the challenges faced by efforts to promote a social vulnerability
approach.
The inﬂuence of national level initiatives on London’s adaptation position was
illustrated by two national policy outcomes: the Pitt Review (2007) and National
Heatwave Plan (NHP) (2004). The former stimulated a range of local authority and
GLA reﬂections on ﬂood risk management and the latter continues, through its
Figure 2. Factors Inﬂuencing Orientation of the Current Adaptation Pathway
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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annual revisions, to set the agenda for heatwave risk management in the city.
The NHP is increasingly pushing for transition towards a more joined-up social
care model of resilience, but to-date risk management continues to be delivered
through medical responses and long-term and urban design and planning. Both
processes were responses to major events, ﬂooding across the UK in 2006 with
limited direct impact on London, and a national heatwave in 2003 with a strong
impact on London.
3.1.1. Drivers and constraints for transition
Under London’s resilience regime, growing economic inequality will likely in-
crease the relative burden of self-reliance on households. Most at risk will be
lower-income home owners who tend to be more exposed and susceptible to the
impact of extreme events, and have limited resource to cope including through
reduced take-up of private property insurance (GLA 2011). Respondents identiﬁed
the high costs of ﬂood insurance as a primary reason for lower-income home
owners to be more exposed to risk. In particular, respondents conﬁrmed housing
analysts’ views that a combination of high value private sector housing and
property investments in central London and changes to social support entitlements
were driving a signiﬁcant wealth gap and increasing inequalities between afﬂuent
areas along the River Thames and more socio-economically challenged areas,
predominantly in outer London boroughs (Marom and Carmon 2015).
Growing tension was perceived between affordable insurance as part of a re-
silience orientation to adaptation and the persistence with which public opinion
holds the state as an insurer of last resort. This was considered as a potential
tipping point for transition towards transformative adaptation by a senior policy
manager at the GLA. A? respondent suggested that potential legal disputes over
Figure 3. Actors Inﬂuencing the Current Adaptation Pathway
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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insurance claims could put pressure for policy change nationally with
implications for London:
The availability of affordable insurance will also play a big role.
In the next years we will see a legal challenge over something that
gets ﬂooded and that was insured, and that will ﬂip policy,
I believe.
A resilience orientation to heatwave risk management was criticized for
being reactive and failing to address the more fundamental changes required for
sustainable risk management. In the view of one respondent:
It’s about “be aware” rather than “let’s grow some trees”. It’s
reactive rather than proactive. Cool rooms are there, but there is
nothing about how you can create them. Nothing in the heatwave
plan that really helps me to do forward planning. It says things
like “drink more when it’s hot”. It’s like. . .yeah, ok, but what
about building design, landscaping. We have all these regulations
that say buildings have to be accessible, but nothing that says they
have to be livable.
The high costs of retroﬁtting existing buildings and for systematically integrating
cooling in new building design were perceived as a barrier to transition towards a
more transformative orientation in adaptive to heatwave risk. Referring to an in
2013 when an inappropriately designed building magniﬁed sunlight damaging cars
(see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-23930675), a risk manage-
ment ofﬁcer from Health England stated:
It’s this classic example of the Walkie Talkie (20 Fenchurch Street)
where you design a building that ends up burning your car. The
evidence is here, but planning laws are just ridiculous. In our
planning laws, we have a lot about aesthetics, a lot about ﬁre
safety. But we have not built in climate change. This is because of
the ﬁnancial impact that it would have, I believe. If you put in
forward-thinking people will look at you and go “Really? That is
what you expect me to spend?”
The high costs of retroﬁtting existing building stock in London points to a limited
potential for physical adaptation to heatwave risk in the city and an example of
lock-in. Even if policy were to transition regulating building design, impacts on the
ground might unfold only incrementally over long periods of time. This form of
lock-in points to the importance of developing effective planning and building
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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regulations now for adapting building stock to risk anticipated for mid-century.
With the right incentives private and public sector property owners could reorient
quickly. However, the Head of Emergency Planning from an outer-London local
authority underlined how a lack of available resources and the limited space in
central London constrained such future-oriented considerations of climate risk:
Because of the resources, the space, the money that we have got
I think that everybody accepts that there will never be a perfect
approach. Many things that matter for heatwaves, like the
building structure and the planning, are already locked in. Unless
we would build a new city from scratch, it is about trajectories.
The Head of Emergency Planning from a London local authority argued that
advice on building design in the NHP would fail to address problems with existing
building stock:
The NHP does spell out that these long-term planning issues are
important, issues like building design etc. The challenge is that a
lot of buildings are old, and the advice is rather targeted at new
developments. In many ways I think the advice does not ﬁt the
realities.
GLA as well as local authority level agencies were united in a concern for the
apparent difﬁculty in formulating effective, actionable strategies to adapt existing
physical infrastructure in London to extremes. The London Fire Brigade suggested
that a failure in risk management policy to address lock-in effects of heatwave
vulnerability was acknowledged in the wider risk management community of
practice in London, stating:
Councils and the health services they often look at planting trees,
at greening, and at increasing natural cooling. Everywhere we try
to improve natural ventilation. All of this, however, seems to be for
new developments, for new buildings. I am not sure what we do
for old buildings, for those that already exist.
3.2. Is there evidence that a transition to a new risk management
pathway position is desirable among practitioners?
Within the next 20 years (by 2035), respondents expected current trends in extreme
weather to intensify with: changes in environmental and biophysical hazards (more
ﬂoods, more heatwaves), socio-demographic changes (especially aging) and eco-
nomic inequality aggravating future risk and adaptive capacity. A majority of
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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respondents also suggested that a governance capacity for adaptation and risk
management in London would continue to decline. In this context, concern that the
current resilience approach and drift towards self-reliance would not be able to
adequately prepare the city for future risk scenarios was articulated by both local
authority and GLA agencies. The Head of Emergency Planning from an outer-
London borough suggested that a growing city population would be among the
most signiﬁcant future risk factors:
The sheer quantity of people and the density that comes with it will
require a shift towards more fundamental changes in risk man-
agement. The infrastructure that needs to be added, and the
changes in the climate and the impact that this will have on
London also play into this.
A similar view was expressed by a senior policy and program manager at the GLA,
who reﬂected on the need to transition from current planning practices to help face
potential extremes in future risk scenarios. The GLA 2015 population projections
project the total population of Greater London to rise by 2.35 million between
2014 and 2041 to reach 10.89 million (see https://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/2015-
round-population-projections). According to the respondent, current infrastructure
capacity would not sustain this signiﬁcant increase in population in London:
We will have three million more people in London quite soon. We
have already stretched our infrastructure for the past 100 years.
We can’t keep stretching it like that. So how do we get towards less
demand on infrastructure and to new infrastructure that is
designed for climate change? It means we need to do things
differently than we do today.
To help gauge the relative importance of these factors in provoking a transition
respondents were presented with four scenarios for London in 2035: (A) a dou-
bling of hazard intensity and frequency; (B) hazard doubling plus a doubling of the
population over 65 years of age; (C): a doubling of hazard, aged population and
social inequality, (D) a doubling of hazard, aging, inequality and a halving of risk
management capacity. Given these extreme scenarios, respondents agreed that
transition to a more transformative regime in London was inevitable by 2035, but
differed in the primary tipping point for transition (Figure 4). Scenario C (more
heat/ﬂoods þ aging population þ social inequality) was most often considered the
tipping point for transition. This indicates a strong degree of perceived robustness
in the current risk management system and reinforces the importance of social
inequality as a rising driver for transition.
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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Growing social inequality was seen by all levels of London’s administration as a
challenge that would require fundamental changes in the way that government
assistance to citizens should be targeted in times of emergency. Respondents
expected that under increased inequality many more people in London would
depend on government assistance, putting further pressure on the public sector to
provide services. A climate change ofﬁcer from a London local authority suggested
that growing inequality would further aggravate problems of the poor to access
insurance so putting pressure on the self-reliance model of adaptation that is
currently being emphasized:
“This would mean we would have more people depending on
government assistance during a crisis. For economically mar-
ginalized people it would be harder to get insurance, there would
be very little capacity to adapt your own dwelling and to respond
on your own.”
Inequality raised a policy challenge for resilience: Is it possible to both enhance
social justice and redistribution goals, and self-reliance? Respondents acknowl-
edged that if major changes to risk management were needed city-wide, national
government assistance to vulnerable people would have to be targeted more
precisely, to prevent costs escalating. To achieve such a change in resilience
planning that would embed it more ﬁrmly in economic development policy
political support from the Mayor of London and from national government would
be needed. Providing measures to support those unable to self-protect would
likely need to invoke reform to local, city or national tax regimes or through
enhanced employment opportunities for people with lower socio-economic and
Figure 4. Starting Scenarios for Transformation in Risk Management
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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educational status, according to a senior manager at the London Resilience Team:
I am not sure that we would cope well with signiﬁcant inequalities.
I think to respond to this scenario (more social inequalities) would
need a massive transfer in resources from the rich to the poor. This
could be done through taxes, but also through a more equal ac-
cess to employment opportunities.
Increased social targeting of public sector support was also seen as inevitable,
according to a respondent from the London Resilience Team:
(. . .) we would need to really go back to the core of what govern-
ment is there for, to the core of the purpose of government and the
public sector. It would entail changing what gets responded to and
what not. In this scenario, it is not about risk reduction in a broader
sense, but the diminished governance capacity would force us to
focus on business continuity. This inevitably puts more people at
risk, and we would have to cherry-pick what gets a response.
The identiﬁed need for more a transformative orientation in adaptation and risk
management under the 2035 risk scenarios discussed with respondents is sum-
marized in Figure 5. Resilience and resistance remain in this future vision, but are
both much reduced.
3.2.1. Austerity and self-reliance: A contemporary driver for transition
Austerity has already been felt through a transition towards resilience through self-
reliance. The Head of Emergency Planning from one inner-London borough
envisioned further austerity programs limiting risk management interventions to
public information services. The public sector would be forced to retreat into only
enabling disaster affected communities to help themselves, direct intervention
would be hard to justify with deeper austerity.
Figure 5. Expected Direction of Change in Risk Management
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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“It comes down to public information. The paradigm that
underpins this approach on information is self reliance. People
have to help themselves. 50, 60 years ago self-help was built in the
system, it was expected that everybody looks after themselves.
This ethos has been lost in the past couple of decades, but with
austerity it is back. In a way we are establishing old ways in a new
world.”
A senior emergency planner from a London local authority noted that delivering
mandated responsibilities under austerity had led to public–private partnerships
and a larger role for private sector stakeholders alongside self-responsibility and
‘community resilience’ in meeting public service delivery aims.
“We are already facing signiﬁcant cuts in government resources.
We already have to adopt policy that means an increase in private
sector investment into public policy, because this is more sus-
tainable. Already we are putting a lot of emphasis on building
community resilience, about promoting ownership and self-
responsibility. This would continue to be the dominant approach.
The private sector is where the money is. Government activity
in this scenario would be about building partnerships with the
private sector and giving them direct responsibility for risk
management.”
The effects of increased targeting for risk management can already be seen. This
includes science-based rationalizing of resources such as Fire Stations and Public
Health Centers. A risk management ofﬁcer at a local authority suggested that
evacuation and care provision for disaster affected people had already suffered
signiﬁcant cut backs in recent years. This was now targeted much more strongly
towards directly affected people. While such a targeting approach might increase
efﬁciency in government spending, it also potentially aggravates existing
inequalities in the capacity of people to help-themselves:
“I think we would see a complete change in government mindset
here. Risk management would be that people have to look after
themselves. There would be no calling of 911 anymore; we would
have to help ourselves. So risk management would be about
helping people to help themselves. That would be the norm. I think
we are close to that tipping point already. It used to be that if we
had a ﬁre, for example, it would be about evacuating all people
from the building, set up temporary shelter, treat them as guests,
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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look after them, provide food, drink etc. Now we ask: ok there is
ﬁre on the 8th ﬂoor, so who really needs to get evacuated from the
building. Probably the people on the 3rd ﬂoor are ﬁne. We then
expect that people seek accommodation themselves, and that they
return as quickly as possible. The problem with that is that it
matters how afﬂuent you are. The less afﬂuent the more you need
help from the government. If you have money you can buy in-
surance, but if you are a migrant with no money and no social
networks you have nowhere to go.”
A similar view, already identifying a shift towards self-reliance and community
resilience from a Head of Emergency Planning in an outer London borough
expressed concerns about potentially negative implications for disaster affected
communities:
“The problem is that many people might do the wrong things if
they are asked to do them themselves, that they interpret their
responsibility wrongly. A basic responsibility to care for people
will always shape local government actions. But the paradigm
will be more strongly about self-help, and those that are ﬁnan-
cially able to help themselves.”
3.3. Capacity and trajectory for transition
Strategic transition in London, in any direction, was considered to require lead-
ership, or at least support, from national government and government agencies.
Without political goodwill and technical expertise deliberate transition was con-
sidered unlikely to be successful. In addition, two city level groupings of actors
were consistently identiﬁed as critical for transition, both offering potential cata-
lysts and champions for change in the adaptation–development nexus (Figure 6).
First, the Ofﬁce of the Mayor and its technical partner the GLA. The Mayor’s
Adaptation Strategy for London is an example of a? London-based initiative and a
vehicle for transition that pushes towards the transformation desired of many sta-
keholders. It offers a vision of amore preventive and a forward-looking orientation to
climate risks. But the power of the Mayor and GLA to enact this transition is limited
by the availability of resources. A senior climate changemanager at the national level
Environment Agency pointed to this opportunity and constraint:
“The proactive elements are in the Mayor’s Adaptation Policy.
It really called on being proactive. We are now starting to develop
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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policy around future pathways. These are not precise scenarios of
what will happen in the future, but it starts to get us thinking about
what we need to do. There is no funding for it yet, in fact we have
to try to put the money in ourselves. It is already there on paper,
we have it in the adaptation strategy, now it is about moving it to
decision making.”
A second actor base arises from collaborations between scientists, disaster risk
practitioners and local authority political leaders. The Head of Emergency Plan-
ning from an inner-London argued that bottom-up transition in London required
this collaboration:
“I think three main actors would be particular important. Scien-
tists and academics that provide in depth policy relevant knowl-
edge, experienced risk managers and contingency planners that
can put this knowledge in practice, and political leadership to
support them in doing so. Alone none of the three could make a
difference, it takes the collaboration.”
While it is possible to point to national policy that has stimulated movement in
London, for example the Pitt Review and NHP, both are reactive. National policy
has a history of following rather than anticipating events. This is problematic for
managing climate change in the concentrated risk and dynamic social and envi-
ronmental landscape of London. A senior risk management ofﬁcer at Transport for
London saw this culture as very difﬁcult to shift: despite increasing levels of risk in
London, the resilience approach would likely continue to be shaped in a reactive
way, by major events, and would remain responsive, prioritizing lessons that help
Figure 6. Drivers for Policy Transition in London
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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to avoid past disasters in the future, rather than anticipating potential future events
that had not yet materialized:
“I don’t see any change happening here in the future. I think at the
moment, we are in the calm before the storm, as the environment
changes, the population changes. Risks are becoming more likely.
In the long term I think any change would depend on disasters to
happen, but the overall aim would remain a protection of devel-
opment, it would still be stability oriented. If a major disaster
happens all changes are around how you can better respond for
the next one, and you keep that until the next disaster happens.”
This view is echoed by respondents who identiﬁed natural hazard events as the
most important driver for policy reform (Figure 6). Notably limited in impact were
changing public values and science and technology innovation and advice. This
reﬂects also the wider character of planning in London which is heavily inﬂuenced
by the aims of national agencies. Indeed the Head of Emergency Planning from an
outer-London borough suggested that transition in London would need a new,
joined-up political vision and a shared understanding of the aims and prospects of
such a change across government and wider social actors, including business:
“It is already out there, people try to bring about transformation.
But there is no clear idea of what transformation is. Rather each
agency seems to have its own idea. There is no joined up ap-
proach between different agencies, and there is also a clash
between government and business.”
3.3.1. Barriers to transformative regime transition
Political cycles were highlighted as a signiﬁcant obstacle for transitions to long-
term, preventive risk planning. A senior risk manager at the London Fire, Brigade
suggested that electoral cycles undermined political support for planning beyond
5 year time horizons, and expressed little conﬁdence that risk management
approaches would change fundamentally in the next 20 years:
“Our risk management approach is not transformational because
of the political inﬂuence on it. I don’t think we will ever have a
long term strategic approach. It is very much driven by the 5 year
political cycles. There just is no long-term planning for 20–30
years. The mindset is “let’s see how much we get and let’s try to
chop away a minimum and do as much as we can with it.”
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
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Limited political support for planning transitions was also linked to the challenge
of demonstrating value-for-money in the short term. According to a senior risk
manager at Transport for London decision-makers are very sensitive to the need to
demonstrate impact and this is not easy with risk prevention unless in responding
to a major event, as in the Pitt Review and NHP:
“People do not want to think about risks in 20 years time if it costs
them money to act on it now. This is why I believe risk manage-
ment is so important, but also why it is so difﬁcult. We always have
to justify what we do. If we focus on what could happen and it
doesn’t, people think its resources wasted. If we alert people to risk
and they then happen people will question why we spent the money
on risk management if we can’t prevent it from happening.”
This dilemma of successful emergency planning and risk management was also
highlighted by a respondent from the GLA. The respondent linked the phenom-
enon to culturally-rooted public expectations about the role of government, and the
services that it should provide to the citizens:
“A barrier is also the question of how we can celebrate success.
When you successfully adapt and prevent something bad from
happen, that does not make the news. People will just expect this
from government. So there is a lot here about cultural expecta-
tions about the role of government.”
Resource constraints affected all levels of governance in London, and seemed to
diminish signiﬁcantly the capacity of risk managers to implement existing and
develop innovative risk management policies. A senior manager at the London
Resilience Team argued that individual agencies were increasingly focused only on
fulﬁlling responsibilities mandated by the 2005 Civil Contingencies Act. This left
little room for maintaining relationships with other partners and for collective
reﬂection on goals and practical or strategic that might enable transition:
“For heatwaves we have very fragmented responses from the
agencies. Everybody has its own plan. The National Heatwave
Plan is an NHS Plan it is focused on health and does not cut
across agencies. Individual agencies have individual actions.
I think this lack of strategic approach is because the government has
not priority for heat stress, so it is simply down to individual
agencies to meet the legal obligations by implementing some plan.”
M Pelling, T Abeling and M Garschagen
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The Head of Emergency Planning from an outer-London local authority described
how staff cuts had affected information sharing and effective coordination between
different agencies and lines of government in London, exacerbating the frag-
mentation that many explained as the fundamental challenge to strategic transition
“Political change is quite disruptive, and the short-termism that
comes from the political cycles. It can be very inefﬁcient if you
have to go back to square one after four years. Financial lim-
itations at all levels of government also play a huge role. It leads
to a resistance of agencies to engage with people and the com-
munities that they are part of. I see it with a lot of colleagues here
in London, that often have to say “sorry, we can’t come to that
meeting, there is just too much we have to do.”
A policy manager at the GLA suggested that investments in climate adaptation
often lacked direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts, and that this undermined the scope for action
of stakeholders supporting transition. Developing pricing schemes for adaptation
actions emerges as a potentially important step towards a stronger commitment for
adaptation projects:
“The problem is that there is no price for adaptation. We value
it, but can’t really put ﬁgures to it. We deliver against a non-
stationary target. With climate change, we need to deliver a lot
just to hold us where we are. The people who pay for adaptation
and the people that beneﬁt from adaptation are not linked, that
makes it really difﬁcult to make the case for signiﬁcant payments
that need to be made.”
Complacency was also cited as a constraint on transition, allowing questions on
future risk to go unasked and avoiding the opening of a policy agenda from
transition at a time of fragmented governance and public sector austerity:
“What is also a problem is the fact that since we are London,
many people think we are already good at things. There is a bit of
arrogance here. In Canary Warf they had people from New York
come over to look at how they do their security arrangements.
That makes people feel we are already the top players, but there is
so much where we are not strong. Why are we not trying to learn
from others?”
In summary, responses indicate limited scope for transition to a more transfor-
mational approach in London. Most respondents expressed little conﬁdence that
Emergence and Transition in London’s Climate Change Adaptation
1650012-21
J. 
of
 E
xt
r. 
Ev
en
. 2
01
6.
03
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 6
2.
21
6.
20
6.
63
 o
n 
09
/2
7/
19
. R
e-
us
e a
nd
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
the aims of risk management in the city would change signiﬁcantly from resilience
over the next 20 years. However, broader social and economic developments, most
notably funding-cuts and diminishing government capacity suggested creeping
changes towards a stronger role for self-reliance and individual ownership of risk.
The transition being observed is then not planned but a bi-product of national
political values and steering. This meets the fears of respondents that London is
moving towards a more unequal future for risk management.
4. Conclusion
London’s current resilience orientation to climate adaptation is intensifying.
Movement is towards a greater emphasis on self-reliance and is enabled by the
policy discourse of resilience. This is less a strategic policy choice than an outcome
of national austerity measures aligned with the mandated requirements of local
authorities and the GLA. The result is that in a period of social and economic
change and in the face of increasing environmental variability and extremes, public
investment in risk management is decreasing and the responsibility for this is being
placed on the shoulders of individuals. For some, this will be a positive experience,
but for those with limited resources, especially lower-income home owners, there
are dangers of being unable to ﬁll the gap left by a retreating public sector. Perhaps
most concerning are at risk, marginal populations (the elderly, migrants and local
income groups) where hazard exposure and vulnerability may be high but
awareness of shifting responsibility low and capacity to take on the burden of
adaptation through personal risk management is low.
The tension between self-reliance and austerity in this adaptation assemblage
generates an adaptation gap. This gap has not yet been squarely addressed in
London. In part, this is because the shifting movement is unplanned while the
management systems are complex, involving multiple agencies and levels of
government and the political costs for engaging with social justice may be un-
palatable for decision-makers. Nevertheless, if self-reliance is a de-facto policy
position this will have implications for the social and spatial distribution of risk in
London and eventually for risk management resource allocation. The potential
scale of the adaptation gap led respondents to identify new tax regimes and em-
ployment as well as risk management policy as falling within the policy scope for
reducing vulnerability under these circumstances. This points towards the desire
for a transition towards a transformational approach to adaptation. There is as yet
very little analysis on the size of the present adaptation gap, nor of the range of
policy responses that might be possible.
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More purposeful movements in adaptation to extremes can be identiﬁed from
the recent past. In particular, the Pitt Review (2007) on national ﬂood risk man-
agement and the NHP have stimulated local authorities and GLA agencies to
review provision and undertake local adaptations (GLA 2011). Both have served
to improve outcomes and procedures to deliver resilience, but have been less
successful in fostering local actors to consider transition to transformational
policy spaces for adaptation. In contrast, the emergent self-reliance orientation of
the dominant resilience agenda indicates the signiﬁcance of autonomous
incremental transition for constraining transitions towards more transformative
adaptation.
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